Poland: The EU's Problem Child

The last hundred years have been particularly turbulent for Poland. Its geographic centrality in the European landmass has meant that it has experienced the sharp end of 20th century political struggle; characterised by two destructive world wars and decades of Soviet subordination. Although the country’s history has undoubtedly been shaped by this period, it is the last thirty years in particular that have seen Poland develop its own distinct global presence. As the death knell rung out on the Soviet Union, Poland began the process of radical political and economic transformation, which culminated with accession to the European Union in 2004. The country’s development over this period is comparable only to the much lauded Asian miracle, South Korea, as this period of change has seen them raise living standards for large swathes of the population. However, the recent re-election of the PIS party raises questions over what direction Polish democracy is taking and how it will use its leverage in the EU and across the globe.

The speed in which the Soviet Union collapsed was famously swift. However, of all the countries that found themselves outside of Moscow’s influence in the dawn of the 90’s, Poland was first to seize the opportunity for change. Situated on the far-western flank of the Eastern Bloc and with a distinctly Catholic national identity, Poland always distinguished itself from its Soviet counterparts and thus had no trouble with extricating itself from their control. The most radical economic action came in the form of The Balcerowicz Plan. This economic shock therapy was responsible for transforming Poland from a centrally planned economy to a free market system in the style of its Western neighbours. Common taxation, privatisation of major industries and employment protections were some of the key features of this ambitious reform. When coupled with the reintroduction of free media and elections, this combination of reforms boosted Poland’s annual growth exponentially between 1989 and 2000, making it the highest amongst the other post-communist nations. This period of transformative change laid the foundations for Poland’s accession to the EU, along with seven other nations, in 2004.

The EU expansion of 2004 marked the union’s first foray into collaboration with post-Soviet Eastern powers. The EU saw the move as a way to entrench fundamental rights and free market principles across the continent. The inductees saw move as a vital step in developing their emergent economies on the basis of frictionless trade and the collective security that came with closer ties to the West. Of all the inductees, Poland would be the most impactful due to its greater population and geographical dimensions. Although Poland’s heft would see it challenge the Franco-German engine behind the EU’s policy agenda, the wider effect of Poland’s membership meant greater income for the central pot and a renewed appreciation for the freedom of movement principle; more than two million Poles have travelled abroad for work or residence since accession. Greater political integration and strong public support for the European project has seen Poland become the largest benefactor of EU funding, receiving a net total of €127 billion.

Most of the tangible benefits of membership have through the generous cohesion and structural investment funding that is guaranteed as a sweetener to all member states. The purpose of these funds is to reduce economic and social disparities in the most deprived areas of the union. Poland has welcomed this funding as a key incentive to membership, using the grants to upgrade its lagging infrastructure and agricultural components. As well as these prosaic improvements, the funding has also been used to bolster R&D and reinvigorate public-facing community hubs, like the totemic National Stadium in Warsaw. This stadium built as a set piece for the 2012 Euros, stands adorned with the national colours on the banks of the Vistula and faces the capital across the river. While visiting Warsaw in early 2020, I found the city’s contradictions clear to see. It was an intriguing mix of entrenched Catholic tradition and the familiar speed and sleekness that has come to define many EU capitals. Furthermore, continental tourists capitalising on the free movement guaranteed by policies like the Schengen agreement, have also established Polish cities as year round destinations of choice. In practice, the conspicuous development of infrastructure and tourist presence demonstrates the extent to which Poland has been transformed by its membership; and why said membership still garners positive approval rates amongst Poles.

However, this is not to say that Euroscepticism is absent in Poland. As is the trend for many European nations, the main vehicle for anti-EU sentiment is populist political parties. In Poland’s case it is the aforementioned Law and Justice, or PiS party. In comparison to continental upstarts like the Brexit party in the UK or VOX in Spain, PiS is an ingrained force in Polish Politics and has been in power since 2015. By winning and retaining power from the typically centrist Civic Platform, PiS has realigned the political focus away from placatory Eurocentric pragmatism to a distinctly Polish brand of Catholic nationalism. Part of their popularity stems from insistence on building social solidarity through welfare reforms, raising the minimum wage and greater financial support for pensioners and retirees. These policies, which have had an undeniable presence in Polish life for the last five years, unsurprisingly fare well with the rural working class and OAP’s who make up an increasingly large proportion of the country’s aging population. However, as Sussex’s University’s Aleks Szczerbiak puts it, ‘a defence of traditional moral codes and pushing back against western cultural liberalism has always been a key element of Law and Justice’s appeal to more socially conservative voters’. Along with a renewed focus on social welfare, PiS positioned the culture wars at the centre of their re-election campaign last year; taking aim at immigration and LGBTQI issues in particular.

Counter to the tangible financial benefit, the creeping integration into the European sphere also brings perceived national security threats to the Polish voter base. The history of multi-culturalism and sporadic domestic terrorism that has come to define Western European countries is a clear matter of concern to the Polish populace, whose mono-ethnic demographic looks very different to its German neighbours for example. Whilst avoiding an officially Euro-sceptic stance or vying for their own Polexit, PiS publically opposed the EU’s mandatory relocation scheme in 2015 at the height of the migrant crisis. By citing concerns over the viability of integrating North African and Middle Eastern migrants in Polish society, the party projected its conscious and aligned itself with Victor Orban’s Fidesz party as antagonists to the Union’s humanitarian agenda. However, despite this unabashed anti-immigrant narrative and opposition to EU distributive migrant policy, the Polish government under PiS has also quietly presided over an influx of Ukrainian, largely Christian, migrants in the past few years. Ostensibly this migration is justified by the labour shortage currently facing Poland, but one cannot ignore the double standard rife in Polish immigration policy.

LGBTQI issues have also taken centre stage under PiS leadership. While Poles are pretty evenly divided on the question of legal recognition of same-sex civil partnerships, a substantial majority oppose same-sex marriage. Catholic religious doctrine and constitutional wording casts marriage as a happening only between man and woman; nowhere do legitimised homosexual relationships fit into this agenda. Furthermore, with PiS’s public and political popularity being buttressed by influential Catholic pressure groups, traditional family values and social conservatism are becoming further instilled into public policy. The sinister peak of this phenomenon was the emergence of the so-called LGBT-free zones, where public pride displays are banned and institutionalised homophobia is encouraged. Nearly a hundred towns across Poland have publically decried ‘LGBT ideology’ and have passed symbolic resolutions that remove homosexuality from public view. Although largely emblematic and unenforceable, they forced LGBT communities in those areas to make drastic ultimatums on how and where they live their lives. The legitimisation of this homophobia at a governmental level has proved to inflame the culture wars and stigmatise the more liberal minded Polish citizens that believe in the value of equality.

Unsurprisingly, the homophobic zeal set forth by PiS has attracted further opposition from EU leaders in Brussels. In her September 2020 State of the European Union speech, Ursula von der Leyen stated, "LGBTQI-free zones are humanity free zones...and they have no place in our Union.” Similar sentiment has been reiterated by the Union’s Equalities Commissioner, who found that Poland’s LGBT-free zones contravened the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights. The fact that Poland is the only member of the Union to have opted out of signing this charter speaks volumes, but it did not protect them from the pulling of cohesion funding from the towns that embraced the LGBT-free positions. This impasse is currently unresolved and is unlikely to be considering the political capital that PiS has poured into its homophobic agenda. Andrzej Duda, the PiS president and current head of state, summed up the force of his party’s conviction when he once called the promotion of LGBT rights an ideology "even more destructive than communism”.

The result of this state sanctioned xeno and homophobia, combined with the ongoing rule of law crisis precipitated by PiS, does not bode well for EU-Polish relations. Despite being a lead proponent and beneficiary of the EU’s fiscal development, the Polish government under PiS have frequently clashed with what they see as a pushy, socially liberal multi-national body. These incongruous social and legal policies are having the effect of pushing Poland, along with fellow agitator Hungary, to the fringes of the Union. This ostracisation is damaging Poland’s international standing and is restricting it of the funding that has helped it develop into a central European powerhouse. However, that is not to say that the country is destined for decades of conservative, euro-sceptic leadership. The most recent election was won by PiS on the thinnest of majorities (51% to 49%) and the opposition party, Civic Platform, stood on a comparatively liberal, Europhile message. Though the internal action of opposition parties and human rights activists along with the external pressure from Brussels may force future political change, the current PiS government seem set on developing their parochial brand of socially conservative nationalism.